

# The Fracturing of International Law and Order: Strategic Responses in an Era of Zombie International Agencies

Janek Ratnatunga

## Abstract

This article examines the profound disruption in the global rules-based order following a series of aggressive actions by the United States, which have rendered international agencies powerless, or "Zombie Agencies." The metaphor highlights the erosion of global governance institutions amidst unilateral actions, notably by the U.S. under President Trump, who has abandoned international norms in favour of a "might is right" approach. Key events, including the imposition of tariffs, military strikes on foreign nations, and the withdrawal from numerous international organisations, exemplify this shift. These actions have not only destabilised the existing order but have also emboldened other major powers, particularly China, to assert their influence. As traditional alliances waver, the article suggests a future characterised by competing spheres of influence, where national interests eclipse collective governance. The piece raises critical questions about the international community's ability to adapt and respond to these changes, emphasising the precarious state of multilateral cooperation in a world increasingly governed by unilateral power politics.

## Introduction

### The Rise of the Zombie Agency

Unless one was living under a rock, one would know that a Supernova erupted in the first week of January 2026, signalling the end of the *World Law and Economic Order* as we know it. The shockwaves created, especially in the areas of the environment, society, governance (ESG), and climate change, will have a significant impact on the management accounting profession.

Today, the international agencies responsible for enforcing rules-based law and order, such as those in the fields of economics, finance, international trade, health, sovereignty rights, and the environment, have transformed into '*Zombie Agencies*', possessing no power against a rampant superpower determined to uphold its '*might is right*' philosophy. Every day, more and more knives are driven into these United Nations (UN) and non-UN Agencies, but like the Zombies in the 'Friday the 13th' movies, you cannot kill them because they are already dead!

The first knife was driven on April 2, 2025, when US President Donald Trump unveiled his "*Liberation Day*" tariffs. But at that time, the international agencies governing trade did not immediately die, thanks to another superpower, China, countering these tariffs with their own similarly supercharged ones.

Further knives were inserted in agencies tasked with implementing rules-based law and order in June 2025, when the *United States* unilaterally conducted airstrikes on three *Iranian* nuclear facilities (Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan) using GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOP). The US used these 30,000-pound "bunker buster" bombs, the largest non-nuclear bombs in its arsenal, in an operation known as "*Operation Midnight Hammer*".

By bombing another country without declaring war, *International Humanitarian Law (IHL)*, also known as the *Laws of War*, particularly the *Geneva Conventions* and *Hague Rules*, was completely ignored. The UN did not approve the dropping of bombs on Iran in 2025; in fact, *UN Secretary-General António Guterres* said that he was “*gravely alarmed by the use of force by the United States against Iran and that this was a dangerous escalation in a region already on the edge – and a direct threat to international peace and security.*”

On December 10, 2025, the United States inserted a sharper knife more deeply into rules-based law-and-order agencies by boarding and seizing an oil tanker linked to Venezuela, specifically the vessel *Skipper*, off the coast of Venezuela. The seizure was framed as part of a U.S. operation to enforce sanctions on Venezuela’s oil trade, which the U.S. government views as a way to finance illicit drug-related activities. The *Skipper*, a very large crude carrier, was allegedly part of a “shadow fleet”, and the US claimed it was falsely flying the flag of *Guyana* at the time of its capture.

The international law that applied in the case of this action, according to legal analysts and US justification, was the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 110*, which specifically gives the right to board a vessel deemed “*without nationality*” or flying a false flag.

Venezuela condemned the seizure as an “act of international piracy” and a violation of the UN Charter, arguing the US had no jurisdiction to enforce its laws on non-US persons or vessels outside its territory without a UN Security Council mandate.

However, the knife that finally killed all pretexts that we still live in a rules-based world was inserted on 3 January 2026, when the United States launched military strikes on Venezuela and kidnapped *President Nicolás Maduro* and his wife, *Cilia Flores*, in an operation codenamed ‘*Operation Absolute Resolve*’.

Commentators were quick to describe the US strikes in Venezuela as a breach of *article 2(4) of the UN charter*, stating that the US’ actions are only lawful if supported by a resolution from the UN Security Council, or if the US was acting in self-defence, or if there was consent by the lawful government of Venezuela to the intervention (McKelvie, 2026).

There was no UN Security Council authorisation for the US to intervene in Venezuela, nor had the US been the victim of an ongoing or imminent act of aggression by Venezuela, and there certainly was no consent given by the government of Venezuela.

Some purists still claim that international law is alive, even though the most powerful nation no longer respects it. They argue that breaches of the law are normal in any legal system. Indeed, they are expected, they argue; otherwise, the rule would be unnecessary.

Their view is that international law is created by all states, not just the powerful few. This makes international community reactions to breaches particularly important, they claim. Thus, to preserve the rules-based international order, these purists implore all states to call out breaches of the law when they occur, including in the current instance of the kidnapping (Heathcote, 2026).

But what if the UN agencies, designed to address breaches of law and order, are now ineffective—worse than toothless tigers—because they have been reduced to Zombies, unaware that they are now the walking dead?

## **When Might is Right.**

The US president has openly admitted that his ambition in Venezuela is to turn a profit from its oil and is now demanding control of Greenland (“whether they like it or not”) in the hope of painting

the world map with the US stars and stripes. All pretexts of controlling drugs and sanctioned oil have been abandoned.

The Trump vision comes with proof of his willingness to deploy hard power, rather than merely posting “truths” on social media, to get his way. It shakes old alliances because it comes with a signal that he could use force against others – even NATO members – if they do not submit to his plans (Crowe, 2026).

It feels like a new world disorder. The sense of balance in world politics is shifting, and a new era of great power competition is underway. In this world, “*might is right*”.

Despite their belief in a similar worldview, *Chinese President Xi Jinping* and *Russian President Vladimir Putin* have largely acted within the boundaries of international law and order—up to this point. It is President Trump who must single-handedly be given credit for the death of the world’s rules-based law and economic order as we knew it in the past.

Clearly, we now have an era where major rivals seek to impose their will across their ‘*spheres of influence*’. American allies, such as Australia, must adapt because they have no choice but to survive in this new dispensation. “*If you’re not running a sphere of influence, you’re in one*” (Crowe, 2026).

There are four major powers in this world view: the *United States*, *China*, *Russia* and *India*. Although Russia’s nominal GDP typically puts it behind major EU nations like Germany, France, and the UK, it is a nuclear state that is aggressive in using its military. Two of the four superpowers, *Russia* and *China*, are considered ‘rogue states’ by the western media, but, as mentioned earlier, they have behaved, up to now, within acceptable tolerances of international law and order. It is the United States that has gone full-rogue by undermining very directly the politics of countries around it without any consideration for rules-based law and order.

## **The Role of Middle-Powers**

Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney acknowledged the global rules-based order is permanently ‘fractured’ at the World Economic Forum’s Devos 26 in speech that went viral. The speech is so perceptive that the full text is reproduced as *Appendix 1* (Carney, 2026).

PM Carney emphasized the end of the rules-based international order and outlined how Canada was adapting by building strategic autonomy while maintaining values like human rights and sovereignty.

The Canadian PM called for middle powers, such as his own, to work together to counter the rise of hard power and the great power rivalry, in order to build a more cooperative, resilient world.

## **The New Ethos for Using Power**

President Trump has the power, and he has demonstrated that he will use it as he wants. In fact, one of the President’s most dedicated acolytes, *Mr Stephen Miller*, the White House deputy chief of staff, said as much this week (Tingle, 2026).

“*We live in a world in which you can talk all you want about international niceties and everything else,*” he told CNN on January 6, 2026. “*But we live in a world, in the real world, that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world.*”

Miller was direct about the rationale for intervening in Venezuela.

*“The US is using its military to secure our interests unapologetically in our hemisphere,” he said. “We’re a superpower, and under President Trump, we are going to conduct ourselves as a superpower.”*

Probably in response, French President Emmanuel Macron shattered the traditional façade of America as a dependable ally. He spoke on January 8, 2026, in Paris about the danger of the US *“turning away from some of its allies” and “freeing itself” from international rules.*

*“It’s the greatest disorder, the law of the strongest, and everyday people wonder whether Greenland will be invaded, whether Canada will be under the threat of becoming the 51st state or whether Taiwan is to be further circled,”* Macron told French diplomats, in remarks reported by the Associated Press (AP Newsroom, 2026).

He foresaw a “dysfunctional” era where major powers like the US and China would be tempted to divide the world among themselves.

## **Venezuela: A Precedent for China?**

How China responds is now a key factor in the aftermath of the US operation in Venezuela, but some commentators believe that there are flaws to the theory that President Xi will be emboldened to copy President Trump and send Chinese special forces into Taiwan. This is because they argue that Beijing would know it is an extremely difficult operation, and they would not be reckless about it. They would know all of the ramifications and risks if it went wrong – and there are many, many ways in which it could go wrong (Visentin, 2026).

The wider, longer-term impact of President Trump asserting his personal power is that by blowing up the international rule-based order, he is speeding up China’s resolve to be a superpower to rival America. The Chinese economy is growing; its people are steadily becoming wealthier; money is pouring into the Chinese defence forces; and Beijing is determined to assert itself in Asia and the world. Beijing will perceive the USA’s actions as a confirmation that their time is approaching more rapidly than they initially anticipated.

The facts are that major powers will always prioritise national interests over international laws. As the two great powers selectively decide which rules apply to them, Beijing will surely be content to see the US tied up in arenas it has no desire to enter into, while America’s partners grow increasingly uncomfortable at the actions of their ally.

This means the future is all about competing spheres of influence because none of the actions by the Trump White House block China from increasing its power. Consequently, nations across Asia may need to rethink the wisdom of being aligned with Washington, DC, when the leader in the White House is such an unreliable ally. Europe may need to consider the unthinkable: inviting Russia to join NATO. After all, as spoken by Michael Corleone in the Godfather Part II movie, *“Keep your friends close, but your enemies closer.*

If America persists with its current behaviour, it will no longer be able to function as a significant force in Europe or Asia within the next decade, as countries in these regions will begin to make their own decisions about their alliances. Recent actions have demonstrated to the outside world, friends and foes alike, that they cannot make any assumptions about America’s role going forward.

## **Attacks on the Zombie Agencies Continue**

The Rules-based order is dead. The UN agencies are the walking-dead. But President Trump continues to stab them in new ways on a daily basis. On January 9, 2026, he pulled the US out of 66 international organisations that he deemed *“wasteful, ineffective, or harmful.”* The list included 31

UN organisations and 35 non-UN organisations, all deemed contrary to the interests of the United States to remain a member of, participate in, or otherwise provide support for.

Almost half of those 66 organisations are devoted to upholding international law and protecting women and children from violence. These organisations, according to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, now advance agendas that are “contrary” to the US. The organisations on the list, he said, were taking the “*blood, sweat and treasure of the American people*”.

A White House fact sheet contended those groups operated contrary to US national interests, security, economic prosperity, or sovereignty. Many of these bodies, as the White House claimed, promote radical climate policies, global governance, and ideological programmes that conflict with US sovereignty and economic strength. “*By exiting these entities, President Trump is saving taxpayer money and refocusing resources on America First priorities*” (Morris-Grant, 2026).

According to the presidential memorandum and White House announcements, the list is divided into two categories: 31 UN bodies and 35 non-UN organisations. This distinction was explicitly outlined in the official releases to highlight the broad scope of the policy beyond just UN-affiliated groups.

## The Details of the Withdrawal

The presidential memorandum, released by the White House, specifies that the withdrawals are intended to eliminate U.S. involvement in entities that “advance globalist agendas over U.S. priorities.” Among the 31 UN bodies targeted are key programmes focused on climate change, population, women’s rights, energy, and water resources. Notable examples include:

- *The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)*, the foundational treaty for global climate action signed in 1992.
- *The UN Population Fund (UNFPA)*, which addresses reproductive health and population issues.
- *UN Women*, dedicated to gender equality and women’s empowerment.
- *UN Energy and UN Water*, which coordinate international efforts on sustainable energy and water management.

The 35 non-UN organisations span a wide range, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the *Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation*, and the *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance*. These bodies cover areas like climate science, democratic governance, migration, and labour standards. The US State Department, in an accompanying release, described these institutions as “redundant, mismanaged, unnecessary, or poorly run”, justifying the cuts as a means to redirect resources towards domestic priorities.

A review of the full list found at least 16 groups focusing on climate change and the environment and 14 focused on international law, peacekeeping and protection of vulnerable groups.

Of much concern to management accountants was that one of the agreements included on the list is the *UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)*, which has been in place for more than three decades. The agreement, signed by 198 countries, serves as the baseline for the landmark *Paris Agreement*, a legally binding treaty to limit global warming.

President Trump pulled the US out of that agreement during his first term in 2016, then again in 2025, just hours after his second inauguration. The withdrawal will become official later this month, one year after the formal notification. His decision made the US one of just four countries not included in the *Paris Agreement*—alongside *Iran, Libya, and Yemen*.

At the same time, he suspended support for the *World Health Organisation (WHO)* and other UN agencies. The focus of five additional groups was on curbing international security threats, counterterrorism, and cybercrime.

In his statement this week, *Secretary of State Marco Rubio* said the organisations were “*often dominated by progressive ideology*” and “*detached from national interests.*”

“*[What] started as a pragmatic framework of international organisations for peace and cooperation has morphed into a sprawling architecture of global governance,*” he said.

President Trump has indicated that there will be more agencies that the US will withdraw from. But it does not matter how many agencies the US withdraws from. The moment the US walked away from any pretext of upholding rule-based law and espoused the view that “*might is right*”, all these agencies became Zombies. No matter how many knives are stuck into them, you cannot kill them, as they are already dead.

## Conclusion

The events of early 2026 have dramatically underscored the erosion of the rules-based international order, with the United States at the forefront of this seismic shift. The metaphor of “*Zombie Agencies*” aptly encapsulates the current state of global governance institutions, which now function as powerless entities in the face of aggressive unilateral actions by dominant superpowers. The U.S., under President Trump, has decisively abandoned international norms, opting instead for a “*might is right*” strategy that disregards established laws and multilateral agreements.

The abandonment of international law by the U.S. is reshaping global dynamics and accelerating the rise of other major powers, particularly China, which sees an opportunity to assert its influence more robustly. This shift has implications for global alliances, as traditional U.S. allies reconsider their positions in an increasingly unpredictable geopolitical landscape. As the U.S. withdraws from international organisations and treaties, the global community is left grappling with the reality of a new world disorder, where power dynamics are redefined, and the future of multilateral cooperation, if not dead, hangs precariously in the balance.

Ultimately, the current trajectory suggests a world moving towards competing spheres of influence, where national interests overshadow collective global governance. The challenge now lies in how the international community will respond to these changes and whether it can adapt to preserve any semblance of a cooperative global order amid the prevailing ethos of unilateralism and power politics.

## Appendix 1

### Davos 2026: Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada

Today I will talk about a rupture in the world order, the end of a pleasant fiction and the beginning of a harsh reality, where geopolitics, where the large, main power, geopolitics, is submitted to no limits, no constraints.

On the other hand, I would like to tell you that the other countries, especially intermediate powers like Canada, are not powerless. They have the capacity to build a new order that encompasses our values, such as respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the various states.

The power of the less power starts with honesty.

It seems that every day we're reminded that we live in an era of great power rivalry, that the rules based order is fading, that the strong can do what they can, and the weak must suffer what they must.

And this aphorism of Thucydides is presented as inevitable, as the natural logic of international relations reasserting itself.

And faced with this logic, there is a strong tendency for countries to go along to get along, to accommodate, to avoid trouble, to hope that compliance will buy safety.

Well, it won't.

So, what are our options?

In 1978, the Czech dissident Václav Havel, later president, wrote an essay called *The Power of the Powerless*, and in it, he asked a simple question: how did the communist system sustain itself?

And his answer began with a greengrocer.

Every morning, this shopkeeper places a sign in his window: 'Workers of the world unite'. He doesn't believe it, no-one does, but he places a sign anyway to avoid trouble, to signal compliance, to get along. And because every shopkeeper on every street does the same, the system persist – not through violence alone, but through the participation of ordinary people in rituals they privately know to be false.

Havel called this "living within a lie".

The system's power comes not from its truth, but from everyone's willingness to perform as if it were true, and its fragility comes from the same source. When even one person stops performing, when the greengrocer removes his sign, the illusion begins to crack. Friends, it is time for companies and countries to take their signs down.

For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-based international order. We joined its institutions, we praised its principles, we benefited from its predictability. And because of that, we could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection.

We knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false that the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient, that trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And we knew that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.

This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in particular, helped provide public goods, open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security and support for frameworks for resolving disputes.

So, we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals, and we largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality.

This bargain no longer works. Let me be direct. We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition. Over the past two decades, a series of crises in finance, health, energy and geopolitics have laid bare the risks of extreme global integration. But more recently, great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.

You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration, when integration becomes the source of your subordination.

The multilateral institutions on which the middle powers have relied – the WTO, the UN, the COP – the architecture, the very architecture of collective problem solving are under threat. And as a result, many countries are drawing the same conclusions that they must develop greater strategic autonomy, in energy, food, critical minerals, in finance and supply chains.

And this impulse is understandable. A country that can't feed itself, fuel itself or defend itself, has few options. When the rules no longer protect you, you must protect yourself.

But let's be clear eyed about where this leads.

A world of fortresses will be poorer, more fragile and less sustainable. And there is another truth. If great powers abandon even the pretence of rules and values for the unhindered pursuit of their power and interests, the gains from *transactionalism* will become harder to replicate.

Hegemons cannot continually monetize their relationships.

Allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty.

They'll buy insurance, increase options in order to rebuild sovereignty – sovereignty that was once grounded in rules, but will increasingly be anchored in the ability to withstand pressure. This room knows this is classic risk management. Risk management comes at a price, but that cost of strategic autonomy, of sovereignty can also be shared.

Collective investments in resilience are cheaper than everyone building their own fortresses. Shared standards reduce fragmentations. Complementarities are positive sum. And the question for middle powers like Canada is not whether to adapt to the new reality – we must. The question is whether we adapt by simply building higher walls, or whether we can do something more ambitious.

Now Canada was amongst the first to hear the wake-up call, leading us to fundamentally shift our strategic posture.

Canadians know that our old comfortable assumptions that our geography and alliance memberships automatically conferred prosperity and security – that assumption is no longer valid. And our new approach rests on what Alexander Stubb, the President of Finland, has termed “value-based realism”.

Or, to put another way, we aim to be both principled and pragmatic – principled in our commitment to fundamental values, sovereignty, territorial integrity, the prohibition of the use of force, except when consistent with the UN Charter, and respect for human rights, and pragmatic and recognizing that progress is often incremental, that interests diverge, that not every partner will share all of our values.

So, we're engaging broadly, strategically with open eyes. We actively take on the world as it is, not wait around for a world we wish to be.

We are calibrating our relationships, so their depth reflects our values, and we're prioritizing broad engagement to maximize our influence, given and given the fluidity of the world at the moment, the risks that this poses and the stakes for what comes next.

And we are no longer just relying on the strength of our values, but also the value of our strength. We are building that strength at home.

Since my government took office, we have cut taxes on incomes, on capital gains and business investment. We have removed all federal barriers to interprovincial trade. We are fast tracking a trillion dollars of investments in energy, AI, critical minerals, new trade corridors and beyond. We're doubling our defence spending by the end of this decade, and we're doing so in ways that build our domestic industries.

And we are rapidly diversifying abroad. We have agreed a comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU, including joining SAFE, the European defence procurement arrangements. We have signed 12 other trade and security deals on four continents in six months. The past few days, we've concluded new strategic partnerships with China and Qatar. We're negotiating free trade pacts with India, ASEAN, Thailand, Philippines and Mercosur.

We're doing something else. To help solve global problems, we're pursuing variable geometry, in other words, different coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests. So, on Ukraine, we're a core member of the Coalition of the Willing and one of the largest per capita contributors to its defence and security.

On Arctic sovereignty, we stand firmly with Greenland and Denmark, and fully support their unique right to determine Greenland's future.

Our commitment to NATO's Article 5 is unwavering, so we're working with our NATO allies, including the Nordic Baltic Gate, to further secure the alliance's northern and western flanks, including through Canada's unprecedented investments in over-the-horizon radar, in submarines, in aircraft and boots on the ground, boots on the ice.

Canada strongly opposes tariffs over Greenland and calls for focused talks to achieve our shared objectives of security and prosperity in the Arctic.

On plurilateral trade, we're championing efforts to build a bridge between the Trans Pacific Partnership and the European Union, which would create a new trading bloc of 1.5 billion people. On critical minerals, we're forming buyers' clubs anchored in the G7 so the world can diversify away

from concentrated supply. And on AI, we're cooperating with like-minded democracies to ensure that we won't ultimately be forced to choose between hegemonies and hyper-scalers.

This is not naive multilateralism, nor is it relying on their institutions. It's building coalitions that work – issues by issue, with partners who share enough common ground to act together.

In some cases, this will be the vast majority of nations.

What it's doing is creating a dense web of connections across trade, investment, culture, on which we can draw for future challenges and opportunities.

Argue, the middle powers must act together, because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu.

But I'd also say that great powers, great powers can afford for now to go it alone. They have the market size, the military capacity and the leverage to dictate terms. Middle powers do not.

But when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness. We accept what's offered. We compete with each other to be the most accommodating.

This is not sovereignty. It's the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination. In a world of great power rivalry, the countries in between have a choice – compete with each other for favour, or to combine to create a third path with impact.

We shouldn't allow the rise of hard power to blind us to the fact that the power of legitimacy, integrity and rules will remain strong, if we choose to wield them together – which brings me back to Havel.

What does it mean for middle powers to live the truth?

First, it means naming reality. Stop invoking rules-based international order as though it still functions as advertised. Call it what it is – a system of intensifying great power rivalry, where the most powerful pursue their interests, using economic integration as coercion.

It means acting consistently, applying the same standards to allies and rivals. When middle powers criticize economic intimidation from one direction, but stay silent when it comes from another, we are keeping the sign in the window.

It means building what we claim to believe in, rather than waiting for the old order to be restored. It means creating institutions and agreements that function as described. And it means reducing the leverage that enables coercion – that's building a strong domestic economy. It should be every government's immediate priority.

And diversification internationally is not just economic prudence, it's a material foundation for honest foreign policy, because countries earn the right to principled stands by reducing their vulnerability to retaliation.

So Canada. Canada has what the world wants. We are an energy superpower. We hold vast reserves of critical minerals. We have the most educated population in the world. Our pension funds are amongst the world's largest and most sophisticated investors. In other words, we have capital, talent... we also have a government with immense fiscal capacity to act decisively.

And we have the values to which many others aspire.

Canada is a pluralistic society that works. Our public square is loud, diverse and free. Canadians remain committed to sustainability. We are a stable and reliable partner in a world that is anything but. A partner that builds and values relationships for the long term.

And we have something else. We have a recognition of what's happening and a determination to act accordingly. We understand that this rupture calls for more than adaptation. It calls for honesty about the world as it is.

We are taking the sign out of the window. We know the old order is not coming back. We shouldn't mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy, but we believe that from the fracture, we can build something bigger, better, stronger, more just. This is the task of the middle powers, the countries that have the most to lose from a world of fortresses and most to gain from genuine cooperation.

The powerful have their power.

But we have something too – the capacity to stop pretending, to name reality, to build our strength at home and to act together.

That is Canada's path. We choose it openly and confidently, and it is a path wide open to any country willing to take it with us.

Thank you very much.

## References

- AP Newsroom (2026), "Senior European officials express concern following US comments on Greenland", *Associated Press*, January 9, <https://newsroom.ap.org/editorial-photos-videos/detail?itemid=6687eef081cb4de599b3766ed7f0622e&mediatype=video>
- Carney, Mark, (2026), "Davos 2026: Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada", World Economic Forum, Jan 20. <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/>
- Crowe, David (2026) "Divide and Conquer", *The Age*, Insight, January 10, Pages 33,36-37.
- Heathcote, Sarah (2026), "Were the US actions in Venezuela legal under international law? An expert explains", *The Conversation*, January 4. <https://theconversation.com/were-the-us-actions-in-venezuela-legal-under-international-law-an-expert-explains-272684>
- McKelvie, Geraldine (2026), "Is there any legal justification for the US attack on Venezuela? *The Guardian*, January 4. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/03/is-there-any-legal-justification-for-the-us-attack-on-venezuela-trump-maduro>
- Morris-Grant, Brianna (2026), "Donald Trump pulls US out of dozens of international organisations on environment and security", *ABC News*, January 9. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-01-09/us-withdrawal-trump-united-nations-organisations/106210134>
- Tingle, Laura (2026), "Donald Trump is reshaping American power and the threat to international order is alarming", *ABC News*, January 9, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-01-10/trump-power-venezuela-greenland-international-law-morality/106214406>
- Visentin, Lisa (2026), "Discomforting moment for Beijing, caught on camera hours before Trump's raid", *Sydney Morning Herald*, January 7, <https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/why-trump-s-venezuela-gambit-will-not-change-beijing-s-calculus-on-taiwan-20260107-p5ns89.html>